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The venture capital (VC} industry is a game of"home runs," with a few 
lucrative exits compensating investors for the many ~'strike outs" along the way 
(Gompers and Lerner 2001}. Consistent with this view, finance scholars report that 
VCs aggressively prune weaker startups in their investment portfolios to re-allocate 
resources to their more likely winners (Puri and Zarutski 2012}. Using data on VC-
backed software startups, I nonetheless find many numerous instances where distressed 
startups "restart" rather than cease operations. I investigate broader trends affecting the 
financing opportunities of software startups and compare characteristics of restart and 
non-restart finns within the sector. To complement this quantitative analysis, I conduct 
three case studies that illuminate the factors that could lead finns to be in a "restart 
situation" and the actions taken to tum around these fledgling companies. 
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I.  Introduction 
In the troubled economic times of the 1930s, Joseph Schumpeter extolled the 
entrepreneur as the “hero” of capitalism.  The eminent economist concluded that, 
entrepreneurs—through their innovative activities and “new combinations” of 
resources—were responsible for the “creative destruction” of existing industries and 
played a vital role in the dynamism of capitalistic economies (Schumpter 1950).  Eighty 
years later entrepreneurs are seen as no less critical to the economy, especially in 
technology intensive industries (Kauffman 2013).   
Despite the vital role of entrepreneurship at the economy-level, founding a new 
firm and navigating the pitfalls of the market remains a risky and challenging endeavor.  
Failure is an ever-present shadow. Of particular importance, entrepreneurs can find it 
difficult to secure the capital required to bring new ideas to market. In science and 
technology-based industries, where the path to commercialization is uncertain and 
costly, entrepreneurs depend critically on venture capital (VC) investors for sources of 
funding (Gompers and Lerner 2004).  Even then, the venture capital industry is 
commonly portrayed as a game of “home runs,” with a few lucrative exits compensating 
investors for many “strike-outs” along the way (Gompers and Lerner 2001). Consistent 
with this view, finance scholars report that VCs aggressively prune weaker startups in 
their investment portfolios to re-allocate resources to their more likely winners (Puri 
and Zarutskie 2012). 
This thesis investigates an under-explored phenomenon within the 
entrepreneurship literature: VC-backed startups seemingly en route to failure that 
“restart” rather than cease their operations. Using data on VC-backed software startups, 
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I find many numerous instances where distressed startups restart rather than disband. I 
investigate broader trends affecting the financing opportunities of software startups and 
compare characteristics of restart and non-restart firms within the sector. To 
complement this quantitative analysis, I conduct three case studies that illuminate the 
factors that could lead firms to be in a “restart situation” and the actions taken to turn 
around these fledgling companies. 
The thesis is organized as follows.  Section II provides background information 
on the entrepreneurial process and highlights sources of potential friction between 
entrepreneurs and their VC investors. Section III reports my quantitative analysis. The 
Internet bubble and its subsequent collapse was a pivotal economic event affecting 
technology startups, including but not limited to VC-backed software companies. To set 
the stage for the analysis that follows, I investigate this event and consider its 
implications for the supply of venture capital available for software startups. I then turn 
to my firm-level analysis, where I compare restart and non-restart firms on several 
observable dimensions and analyze potential differences in the ultimate fates of these 
companies.  
To gain additional insights on why a software company might become a “restart” 
(i.e., encounter a severe devaluation event yet continue operations in new form) and to 
illustrate actions taken in the post-restart period, I supplement the quantitative analysis 
with three case studies in Section IV.  I discuss the main findings from my study and the 
opportunities they provide for future research in Section V, the concluding section. 
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II. Background 
Failure of Entrepreneurial Ventures 
Entrepreneurship has been defined as an activity that  
“Involves the discovery, evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities to 
introduce new goods and serves, ways of organizing markets, processes, 
and raw materials through organizing efforts that previously had not 
existed…”   
in short, entrepreneurship involves exploiting the unknown (Shane 2003, p. 4).  A 
critical step in the entrepreneurial process is the recognition of viable economic 
opportunities within this unknown. Where do these opportunities come from?  One 
perspective, originally espoused by Hayek (1945), views these opportunities as arising 
from an individual’s unique access to information.  Entrepreneurs’ “local knowledge,” 
or access to industry specific or opportunity specific information that is not readily 
available allows them to exploit opportunities that would be unrecognized by others 
without such information (Shane 2003).  On the other hand, Schumpeter argued that 
changes in the technological, political, and economic environments are necessary to 
create an entrepreneurial opportunities (Shane 2003).   Schumpeter’s perspective views 
entrepreneurship as a rare occurrence as these environmental changes occur less 
frequently than do opportunities through the availability of local information. 
Notwithstanding the origins of an entrepreneurial opportunity, once formed, 
entrepreneurial firms must secure the capital and resources required to grow the 
business, a task that can be especially difficult in technology-intensive industries.  
Investors may be reluctant to invest in such companies for several reasons.  A prime 
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cause is it may be difficult to secure outside financing is that entrepreneurship often 
results in failure, as “failure and entrepreneurship are natural siblings” (Mantere 2013).  
The prevalence of entrepreneurial failure has been documented in numerous studies.  
For example, in a study of 1,091 Canadian inventors seeking to commercialize their 
inventions, Åstebro (2003) found that only seven percent achieved commercialization.  
This success rate is in contrast to the twenty-seven percent probability of commercial 
success of research and development projects in established firms (Mansfield et al. 
1977). 
Even if investors are knowledgeable of the likelihood of failure and willing to 
embrace this risk, information gaps between the entrepreneur and the potential investor 
may make it difficult to raise funds.  One deterrent is the classic “lemons” problem 
(Akerlof 1970)—if an entrepreneur is better informed about an opportunity than a 
potential investor, investors will be concerned that the opportunity is a “lemon,” and be 
either unwilling to invest or expect a premium on their returns.  This, in turn, will 
discourage entrepreneurs, even with promising opportunities, from seeking outside 
investment. 
Investors may also be concerned about “moral hazard,” or deleterious actions 
that entrepreneurs make take after receive funding that would be counter to their 
original agreement or expectations (Gompers and Lerner 2001). 
One market mechanism that has arisen to address these “failures” in the market 
for new venture financing is the rise of the venture capital firm. According to Mason 
and Harrison (1995), venture capital is “an activity by which corporate investors 
provide long-term equity finance, supported by business skills, to unquoted companies 
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with the potential to grow rapidly with the aim of making an eventual capital gain 
commensurate with the high risk and illiquidity involved in the investment rather than 
interest income or dividend yield.”  
Venture capital firms possess expertise and resources that enable them to 
critically understand the investment opportunity and reduce asymmetric information 
between the entrepreneur and investor.  VCs monitoring the activities of entrepreneurial 
firms in their investment portfolios through several means, including membership on 
the board and frequent site visits (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Hellmann and Puri, 2002).  
To motivate teams while also safeguarding against actions that could devalue their 
investments, VCs also sequence their investments across rounds of financing—waiting 
to release additional funds until milestones have been met (Gompers 1995). By using 
these mechanisms to overcome many of problems inherent in the new-venture financing 
process, venture capital firms play a critical role in realization of entrepreneurial 
opportunity (Metrick and Uasyda 2010). 
Despite these advantages that venture capitalists possess in the evaluation and 
financing of entrepreneurial opportunities, almost two out of every three firms with 
venture capital funding either do not generate positive revenue or ever break even 
Hadzima (2007).  Furthermore in a study of 22,000 VC-backed from 1987 to 2008, 
fifteen percent were liquidated or went bankrupt, and another nineteen percent expected 
no return to investors (Kauffman 2013). 
Internal Sources of Failure 
As discussed above, entrepreneurial firms, even those backed by venture capital 
firms, face low success rates.  Nevertheless, determined individuals frequently pursue 
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their entrepreneurial goals despite these low odds, and for them, entrepreneurship often 
represents a personal journey.  Identifying successful entrepreneurs based on their 
personal traits, however, is difficult, as those who fail often possess similar traits to 
those who succeed (Ucbasaran 2008).  Whether successful or not, however, these traits 
can play a role in the development of the entrepreneurial team that works cohesively 
and effectively.  Problematic internal dynamics or behavioral issues are often major 
contributors to the decline and failure of entrepreneurial firms.  
Overconfidence and the presence of asymmetric information between insiders 
and external constituencies are two other problems often common among failed firms.  
Optimism is a widely recognized as a necessary trait for successful entrepreneurship: 
“Realists will have withdrawn from entrepreneurship…though not all 
optimists necessarily become entrepreneurs, all entrepreneurs will be 
optimists” (Arabsheibani, et al. 2000). 
 
While the confidence by entrepreneurs is often essential to overcome the many 
obstacles that they often face, it can also lead to their downfall (Lowe and Ziedonis 
2006).  Åstebro (2003) found that fully half of 1,091 Canadian inventors creating 
inventions of low quality persisted in developing projects despite negative expert 
recommendations to abandon the commercialization effort.  
External Indicators of Failure 
External and environmental factors can also put pressure on entrepreneurial 
firms and lead to failure. A prominent example is the “money chasing deals” era of the 
late 1990s, when an unprecedented amount of funding flowed into VC investing 
(Gompers and Lerner 2001). The widespread availability of VC funding make it easier 
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for firms to secure capital and remain in business.  In the quantitative analysis below, I 
explore, in more detail, a related event—the Internet bubble and its subsequent 
collapse—and consider its implications for the software startups in my sample. 
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III. Quantitative Analysis 
The Internet bubble and its subsequent collapse was a pivotal economic event 
affecting technology startups, including but not limited to VC-backed software 
companies.  To set the stage for the analysis that follows, I therefore first investigate 
this event more closely and consider its implications for the supply of venture capital 
available for software startups.  I then define my data sources, explain the types of firms 
included in the sample, and clarify the method used to identify the subset of “restarts.” 
After describing overall trends within the sample, I compare restart and non-
restart firms on several observable dimensions and analyze potential differences in the 
ultimate fates of these companies. To gain additional insights on why a software 
company might become a “restart” (i.e., encounter a severe devaluation event yet 
continue operations in new form) and to illustrate actions taken in the post-restart period, 
I supplement the quantitative analysis with three case studies in the section that follows. 
Analysis of Internet Bubble and Effects on VC Investments in Software Startups 
The collapse of the Internet “boom years” is often evidenced by trends in the 
Nasdaq index, where shares of leading technology companies such as Apple Inc. and 
Google Inc. are traded (e.g., see Madsien 2008).  As shown in Figure 1, the Nasdaq 
index climbed steeply in the late 1990s to a height of 4691 on March 24, 2000.  By 
2002, however, most of those gains had been lost.   
Figure 2 reveals even larger swings in annual VC investments in the software 
sector during the 1998-2002 period. Between 1998 and 2000, annual VC investments in 
software surged from $5B to a peak of $26B in 2000, a more than five-fold increase.  
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The annual supply of VC funds to software startups fell back to pre-boom levels of $5B 
by 2002, where it remained through the end of that decade.   
The volatility in annual VC spending in software is particularly striking in 
Figure 3, which plots annual percentage changes in investment levels.  After large 
increases prior the year 2000, the supply of VC funding to software startups declined by 
over 50% in this year alone, followed by another 50% decline in the following year. A 
large-scale study by Gompers et al. (2008) finds a high correlation between the value of 
shares in public equity markets and levels of VC investments. The authors also report 
that trends in VC investing tend to follow public equity markets with a short lag but 
with steeper up-and-down patterns.  In combination, the evidence from Figures 1-3 
mirrors these prior findings. 
Startup-Level Data and Sample Construction 
I now turn to my firm-level quantitative analysis. Data for this study comes from 
Dow Jones VentureSource, an agency that monitors the funding of venture capital 
activity of all VC-backed firms in the United States1. Data provided to me for purposes 
of this thesis covers VC-backed software startups founded between 1987 and 1999 that 
received at least one round of venture capital by 2008.  
VentureSource was first established in 1986. Although the agency provides 
information about startups founded prior to 1986, Gompers and Lerner (2004) 
recommend omitting observations prior to 1987 when use of VentureSource data due to 
under-reporting bias. Restricting attention to startups founded prior to 2000 provides an                                                         1 Professors Rosemarie and Arvids Ziedonis provided me access to these data through a research-use 
agreement with VentureSource. 
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8-year “window” to trace what happens to these firms both before and following the 
collapse of the Internet bubble.  
For each company, I observe its founding year, the state in which its headquarter 
locations is based, the year of a “restart” round (if any), and information about the 
company’s status as of 2008 (e.g., failed? had IPO? acquired?) and its reported value at 
exit.2 The sample consists of 2,133 US-based software startups founded between 1987 
and 1999, all of which had exited in some fashion (whether via IPO/acquisition or 
liquidation) by 2008.  
To identify “restarts,” I rely on categories from VentureSource. More 
specifically, the vendor defines restarts as firms suffering a “significant” decline in 
value at the funding round, or a “down round.” VentureSource does not disclose the 
threshold of “significant” in this context, but reports that the value of existing shares in 
the company is typically “washed out.” Based on VentureSource’s classification, I find 
that 128 firms with “restarts,” which represents 6% of all firms within the sample. 
Despite significant devaluations, these firms continue operations in new form rather 
than closing down and disbanding outright. 
As shown in Figure 4, the number of new software startups entering the sample 
rises in the latter part of the 1990s, with 480 sample companies founded in 1999 
alone—in the peak of the Internet boom period.  Given the large influx of VC funds in 
software shown earlier in Figure 2, this trend is not surprising.   
                                                        2 VentureSource’s information on exit dates and values was supplemented with additional data from Sandhill Econometrics, which tracks outcomes of VC-backed companies.  These data were provided to me through a data-use agreement with Professors Ziedonis.    
 
 
11  
Figure 5 graphs the timing of “restart” events involving software companies in 
the sample.  Although a few firms continued operations despite significant down-rounds 
prior to 2000, the number of restarts jumped sharply following the collapse of the 
Internet bubble and withdrawal of VC financing from the sector.  Prior to 2000, roughly 
three software firms in the sample had a restart event each year.  In 2002 alone, the 
number climbed to a within-sample peak of 24 firms.   
The trend in Figure 5 is likely driven by multiple related factors. As shown 
above, more firms entered the sample in the late 1990s, thus increasing the number of 
firms “at risk” for an event, including but not limited to restarts.  Equally important, the 
decline in market conditions (Figure 1) and retreat of VC money from the sector (Figure 
2) could have placed software firms formed in the boom-period in precarious financial 
situations, increasing the numbers of distressed companies.   
Geographic Distribution of Software Startups and Restarts 
Prior studies report that a few US states and regions dominate the supply of VC 
to US startups, and that VCs located within these states/regions prefer to invest in 
nearby startups (Gompers and Lerner, 2004). In Figure 6, I plot statistics reported by the 
National Venture Capital Association on the share of all US VC funding represented by 
VCs in California’s famous Silicon Valley as well as other areas in the state.   
Consistent with conventional wisdom, Figure 6 reveals that California-based 
investors supply a large share of all VC dollars invested in startups. This percentage has 
been steadily increasing since the mid-1990s, exceeding 40% of national investments by 
1999 and 50% by 2009.  A large fraction of these funds are further targeted towards 
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Silicon Valley.  Figure 6 further suggests that Silicon Valley firms capture 
approximately 80% of VC investments made in California.   
Recent data from the National Venture Capital Association (2014) further 
reports that California-based startups received $3.2B in venture capital funding in 2012, 
representing by far the largest total investment of all states.  Massachusetts, Texas, New 
York, and Washington ranked second through fifth, receiving $1.7B in funding.  Firms 
in the remaining 45 states received $1.4B. 
As Silicon Valley is dominated by information technology, Internet, and 
software startups, we would expect that this region is also heavily represented the 
VentureSource software startup sample. To investigate this possibility, Tables 5 and 6 
reports the distribution of firms by region. The sample is divided between those residing 
within the top five states in terms of funding and the rest of the country.  The subset of 
top five states is further disaggregated by California and the other four top five states.  
As shown in Table 7, California firms represent almost of the half of the overall sample 
(954 of 2,133 firms, or 44.7%).   
Given the more widespread availability of VC funds within California—overall 
and presumably in times of duress, one might expect that restarts are more highly 
represented in this state than is true of non-restart companies.  Surprisingly, however, I 
find no evidence that this is the case:  Although 44.7% of all startups in the sample 
reside in California (954 of 2,133 firms), the percentage of restarts also located in 
California is 44.5% (57 of 128 firms).  Based on a two-sample test of proportions, I find 
that the difference in proportions is statistically insignificant [Pr(|Z| < |z|)=0.96]. 
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At first glance, this result is puzzling.  Restarts face significant set backs yet 
somehow are able to secure the funds required to continue operations.  Since VC funds 
are more plentiful in CA relative to other states, it is reasonable to expect that restart 
firms are more likely to reside within this resource-rich state relative to the broader 
population of startups.  My inability to discern this effect could be due to superior 
capabilities of CA-based VCs in the early pruning of potential strikeouts, as 
documented in prior studies (e.g., Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Puri and Zarutski, 2012).  
In principle, one could disentangle these explanations if characteristics of these 
companies could be better tracked at common intervals in time.  For example, one could 
estimate whether a startup backed by CA investors is more likely to fail outright rather 
than having an opportunity to “restart” relative to comparable startups backed by VCs 
from other states.  Since my data provided information at only certain snapshots in time, 
such an analysis is infeasible in the context of this study.  
Analysis of Exit Outcomes 
In the final part of my quantitative analysis, I trace the ultimate outcomes of 
restart companies and compare them with non-restart firms within the sample.  
VentureSource reports several types of  “exits” for startups, ranging from outright 
“failure,” or termination of operations, to exits via acquisition (ACQ) and other forms 
of buy-out, to the filing of initial public offerings (IPO).   
For non-restarts, identifying the exit event is straightforward as type of exit and 
value is clearly identified in the VentureSource data.  For restarts however, identifying 
final value is less straightforward.  Although VentureSource identifies these firms, they 
are coded as terminated at the “first” exit event.  The data include however, histories 
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subsequent to the initial exit.  One-hundred twenty-seven restarts report a second “exit” 
event and exit value at this time, and one restart went through a second restart event and 
reports a third exit value.  For restarts, therefore, I utilize the value of the firm at the 
second or (third) exit event as the final exit value. 
  Although it is possible that startups may remain private, VCs funds tend to 
liquidate and return funds to investors within ten years of the establishment of a fund 
(Puri and Zarutskie 2012).  Thus, it is unusual that a VC-backed firm would not exit 
within ten years.  Indeed, in my sample, there are no firms that remain private at the end 
of 2008—all firms have exited the sample in one of the modes discussed above. 
To make more direct comparisons among firms, I create three categories of exit 
outcomes: (a) “successful,” (b) “mid-range,” and (c) “failed” firms based on their final 
valuation at exit. Successful firms are defined as those that exit with an IPO filing. An 
IPO is the goal of most VCs and typically results in the greatest value for founders and 
investors (Gompers and Lerner 2004).   “Mid-range” firms, or firms deemed moderately 
successful, are defined as those with positive exit values (typically through an 
acquisition) but that did not have an IPO.  Finally, failed firms are defined as those that 
disbanded or that had a final exit value of zero. 
Comparison of Restart and Non-Restart Firms 
Of the 2,133 software startups in my sample, more than half of the firms (1,137, 
or 53%) exited with “mid-range” outcomes, typically through acquisition.  Of the 
remainder, 727 firms (34%) failed while 237 (11.1%) reached IPO.   
Tables 11 and 12 compare the exit success of restarts with non-restarts. The 
most obvious difference between the groups is in IPO outcomes. Among non-restarts in 
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the sample, over 11% had IPOs.  In contrast, IPOs were far more rare among restarts, 
representing the ultimate outcome for only 3.9% of the restart sample.  A two-sample 
test of proportions reveals that this difference is highly significant [Pr(|Z| < |z|)=0.008].  
This is the first indication that restart firms as a group do less well on average than 
firms that do not undergo a restart.  
Turning next to valuation, the mean exit value of the entire sample of firms is 
$55.88M.  The 2,005 non-restart firms report a higher mean value of $57.50 million at 
exit while restarts averaged a value of $30.44M. This difference is statistically 
significant at the 5% level based on a two-tailed t-test assuming unequal variances. 
Figure 7 shows a histogram of final exit values for the entire sample, and reveals 
a highly skewed distribution. Numerous firms exit the sample with a final value of zero 
while a few firms exit with values exceeding $1M.  Figures 8 and 9 show similar 
patterns for restart and non-restart firms. These patterns are consistent with the notion 
that VC investing is a game with few “home runs” and many “strike-outs” (Gompers 
and Lerner 2001). This pattern is also consistent with the low fraction of successfully 
commercialized inventions reported by Åstebro (2003).3 
Given the skewed nature of the exit-value distribution, I test for differences in 
median exit values since mean values could be misleading.  Median tests are also less 
affected by outlier observations, such as the few home-run successes visible in my 
sample. As reported in Table 2, median exit value for both the entire sample and for 
non-restarts is $7.00M. For restarts, the median exit value is much lower, at only                                                         3 Skewed value distributions have been shown to exist in many innovative contexts.  For example Scherer 
and Harhoff (2000) examined various proxies of value for a sample of 994 US and German patents and 
found that depending on the measure, just 10% of the sample generated between 48% and 93% of total 
value. 
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$3.70M.  A two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test reveals that this difference between 
restarts and non-restarts in median exit value is statistically significant at the 1% level 
(Pr > |z| =0.001). 
Based on these tests, it appears that restart firms tend to do less well than do 
firms that have not suffered a significant down round in value during financing rounds.  
On the one hand, this result could stem from “selection” (Furman and Stern 2011).  By 
definition, restarts are firms that have encountered significant devaluations.  Given this 
fact, it is logical to conclude that these firms are in more precarious financial situations 
than the broader pool of startups from which they are drawn.  On the other hand, there 
could be something about the restart process itself, such as a change in management, 
onerous financial terms imposed by new investors, or another artifact of the procedure 
that hinders the firm going forward. Although I am unable to test between these 
explanations with my data, these results suggest interesting questions that could be 
explored more fully in follow-on studies.   
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V.  Qualitative Analysis 
The quantitative analysis presented in the previous section found that restarts are 
found in the most active areas of venture capital funding of startups, but are equally 
well represented throughout the country.  Despite the sophistication of California VCs, 
restarts appear to be no more likely to occur in that state than elsewhere.  Restarts, 
however, were found to exit at a lower median value than did non-restarts.  The analysis 
was unable, however, to identify factors that could contribute to this lower final exit 
value.  The purpose of the qualitative analysis conducted in this section is to examine 
more closely several cases within the data to identify factors that could have led to their 
distress and subsequent outcomes. 
Ideally, such an inductive approach would select cases that represent both 
successes and failures of restarts.  Selecting only successful restarts could impose a 
“selection bias” and result in erroneously attributing a particular factor or action to a 
successful outcome (Eisenhardt 1989).  Unfortunately, obtaining information on “failed” 
restarts has proven to be difficult.  News reports and documentation of successful 
restarts is much more readily available.  The three selected cases are those for which I 
was able to find information.  The case studies are based upon a compilation and 
analysis of the news articles, company statements, narrative accounts and other public 
information. 
The three companies selected for analysis are Constant Contact of 
Massachusetts, QPass from Washington, and Omneon Video Networks of California. 
Geographically, they collectively represent three of the top five states that received 
venture capital.  Each firm was able to avoid termination as an ultimate fate.  Constant 
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Contact achieved an IPO of $340M while the other two firms were acquired at 
valuations near $275M. 
Despite the large valuations at exit, each of these three firms faced challenges 
that led to a value decline and subsequent restart.  And each was able to undertake 
actions that allowed it to “turn things around.”  Table 13 summarizes the challenges and 
responses by each firm. Below I discuss the three restarts in more detail. 
Constant Contact 
Constant Contact is a restart firm based in Waltham, Massachusetts.  The idea 
underpinning this entrepreneurial venture is the insight by Gail Goodman, the founder 
and CEO, that the rise of social media would spur demand by small businesses for a 
modern print shop that manages marketing communications and customer relationships 
(“Globe 100”).  As Constant Contact’s mission statement states,  
“Constant Contact®, Inc. wrote the book on Engagement Marketing™ 
— the new marketing success formula that helps small organizations 
create and grow customer relationships in today's socially connected 
world. Through its unique combination of online marketing tools and 
free personalized coaching, Constant Contact helps small businesses, 
associations, and nonprofits connect and engage with their next great 
customer, client, or member” (“About Constant Contact”).  
According to Goodman, Constant Contact targets small businesses, typically around 10 
employees.  These customer firms pay a monthly subscription for access to Constant 
Contact’s software-based tools to organize their social media and conduct online 
marketing (“Globe 100”).   
In a speech at the TedxBeaconStreet event in December 2013, Goodman 
described several of the challenges that Constant Contact encountered in growing the 
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company.  She highlighted significant obstacles in creating an effective leadership style, 
learning how to effectively scale-up the business, and how to find and exploit 
competitive advantages (Goodman 2013b).  She further outlined the need for founders 
to reevaluate their contribution styles and roles, as their current styles often impeded the 
growth of the company.  She argued that as the firm grows, the founders (and especially 
the CEO), needed to be able to switch focus and see the larger picture.  Goodman found 
that she often was preoccupied on areas of the business that were already operating 
smoothly while neglecting other areas needing her attention.  To combat this tendency, 
Goodman instituted an anonymous unfiltered feedback system.  This feedback allowed 
her to become aware of the areas that others saw to be lacking and bridge the 
informational gap between not only herself and her employees, but with the company’s 
investors as well.   
Constant Contact also needed to reevaluate its business plan in order to succeed 
within the marketplace and establish profitable margins.   Prior to receiving venture 
capital, Constant Contact expected to sell shares at a price point of fifteen dollars, which 
would have left slim margins, and a very high breakeven point.  By following the 
advice of investors, however, Constant Contact was able to build an increasingly sound 
plan to achieve profitability over time (Goodman 2013a).  Before the correction, this 
major flaw in their financial analysis caused the firm to twice come close to disbanding 
(Kirsner).  By revising its business plan and improving informational flow with its 
investors, Constant Contact was able to avoid failure, however.   These changes 
eventually led to an initial public offering of the company for $340M.  Achieving an 
IPO could only be accomplished by bridging internal as well as external informational 
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and strategic problems, thus attracting new investors such as Greylock Partners, who 
funded Constant Contact’s restart with an investment of $10 million (Garland).   
Qpass 
Constant Contact’s challenges consisted primarily of lack of informational flow 
among the leadership and a flawed business model.  QPass, a Seattle-based software 
firm, faced similar issues but on a much different scale.  Bo Wandell founded QPass in 
1997 as a platform for media firms to sell content over the Internet (Soto 2002).  
According to its website:  
“QPass solutions and services are the critical infrastructure required to 
operate premium services businesses profitably, with the agility required 
to fully capture new opportunities, and with the sound business controls 
and processes required to scale operations efficiently.”   
QPass saw a growing opportunity as the rise of the digital music industry generated 
demand for selling and exchanging this music over the Internet.  A difficult economic 
environment, however, almost resulted in QPass’ failure.   
QPass experienced both the exuberance running up to Internet bubble and the 
deflation after it burst.  In the late 1990s QPass gained significant investor funding only 
to be impelled to lay off 75% of its workforce a short time later (Thurm 2004).  This 
drastic step resulted from the loss of almost 90% of its revenue and 28 out of 32 of its 
dot-com clients in 2000 and 2001 due to the bursting of the Internet bubble (Soto 2002).  
Due to this massive shock to the industry, QPass was forced to reevaluate its business 
model and find a viable position within a devastated market.  While the firm first hit 
rock bottom in revenues and human capital losses, QPass managed to refocus its 
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offerings to a more profitable and diverse segment, providing business systems to 
network operators (Duryee 2005).   
The major shift in direction produced significant challenges in the time and 
effort it took to redirect the company’s vision (Duryee 2005). QPass was also forced to 
recapitalize and convince many of its existing investors to support this redirection while 
simultaneously seeking additional financing from other investors.  Over the course of a 
difficult two years and through the drive and determination of it employees as well as a 
complete shift in direction, QPass successfully restructured, recapitalized, and narrowed 
its scope to a stable more profitable position following the shakeout of the internet 
bubble. Qpass was eventually be acquired by Amdocs for $275 million in 2006 
(Amdocs Inc. 2006). 
Omneon Video Networks 
The strategic shifts that helped to propel QPass into a profitable sector and away 
from failure also played a significant role in the journey of Omneon Video Networks.  
Three former Sony executives, Larry Kaplan, Ed Hobson, and Mike Gilbert, founded 
Omneon in 1998, a software company that markets storage and networking servers to 
television broadcasters to record, store, and edit news feeds for their clients (Business 
Wire 2002).   
Although pursuing a promising opportunity, Omneon faced complications with 
delivery of its services.  Initially after Omneon’s founding the company faced 
significant delays in product development.  A prototype was not ready for testing until 
2000 (Dickson 2008).  This delay caused considerable concern among investors and 
other stakeholders, causing them to doubt the future success of Omneon.   
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The slow product development process stemmed from the inability of Omneon 
to produce key components that would increase the attractiveness of its products in the 
marketplace.  For example, the firm faced difficulties in developing features that 
enabled editing on multi channel servers, which was a key component of its product 
value proposition (Business Wire 2003).  Omneon eventually overcame its product 
development difficulties by forming strategic alliances to obtain the necessary 
development capabilities. For example, it formed an alliance with Editware to obtain 
multichannel editing features (Business Wire 2003). Partnerships such as the one with 
Editware allowed Omneon to reach beyond its existing capabilities to produce a unique 
and superior product.  The partnership with Editware is only one of the many alliances 
Omneon created in order to overcome industry barriers and compensate for its own 
weaknesses.  As it gained capabilities, Omneon was finally able to overcome the costly 
product development cycle that had been limiting its prospects.  Media 100 acquired 
Omneon in 2002 for $273M (Reuters 2002).  
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VI.  Discussion and Conclusion  
Summary of Findings 
Throughout this study, the risky nature of entrepreneurship remains a constant 
despite its vital role of entrepreneurship at the economy-level.  For entrepreneurs, 
failure remains a constant shadow causing the role of VC firms to become critical 
sources for funding and guidance.  Yet even the VC industry is filled with many “strike-
outs” and few “homeruns” (Gompers and Lerner 2001).  Due to this reality, VC firms 
often prune their portfolio to reallocate their resources to more promising firms (Puri 
and Zarutskie 2012).  By studying these pruned out firms, one encounters the 
phenomenon of ‘restart’ firms.   Rather than disband, following this significant loss of 
capital, in numerous cases, as seen in the VentureSource data, these firms “restart” with 
the backing of new investors and/or new management.   
In order to investigate this under-explored phenomenon of ‘restart’ firms, this 
thesis combines the use of both quantitative and qualitative analysis.  The quantitative 
analysis further investigates the impact of the “Internet bubble” and its subsequent 
collapse as well as firm level dimensions which point to unique differences within these 
firms.  As previously stated the collapse of the Internet “boom” years led to a large 
amount of volatility in annual VC investments as well, particularly in the software 
industry.  Within the sample of firms, the greatest amount of firms was established 
during the peak of the Internet boom, 1999 (Figure 4).  Furthermore, the greatest 
number of “restarts” occurred following the collapse of the Internet bubble and the 
withdrawal of VC investments, in 2002 (Figure 5).   
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The impact of VC firms and their investment habits on these restarts can also be 
seen in regards to where these firms are located.  The geographic locations of these 
firms is consistent with conventional wisdom that VCs prefer to invest in nearby 
startups as the great majority of these firms lie in areas known for their high 
concentration of VC firms (Gompers and Lerner 2004).   The high agglomeration and 
sophistication of VC investors within California and other highly concentrated areas of 
VC investment suggests that restarts may also be more prevalent in these areas.  
Consistent with this conventional wisdom, I find that California dominates the sample, 
accounting for 44.7% of all entrepreneurial firms and 44.5% of all restarts (Table 7).   
Yet the proportion of restarts in California was found to be not significantly greater than 
the proportion of restarts among VC-backed firms in other states, suggesting that 
restarts is a more widespread phenomenon than may have been expected. , 
Consistent with conventional wisdom, however, I do find that restart firms 
appear to do less well on average than non-restart firms, as IPOs are more rare among 
restart firms than non-restarts.  Moreover, restart firms “exit” at a significantly lower 
median exit value than do non-restarts. As restarts have already demonstrated that they 
have been on the path to failure, that they are less successful than firms that have not 
“signaled” such low performance, this result is not surprising.  
To gain additional insight on why a software firm might “restart,” and to 
illustrate the paths taken during this restart process, I conducted three case studies of 
restart firms.  The first, Constant Contact from Waltham, Massachusetts, struggled to 
overcome a failed business model and economic troubles as it lost investors.   Through 
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a change of leadership style and a refocused business model, however, Constant Contact 
eventually rebounded and successfully completed an IPO for $340 million. 
QPass from Seattle, Washington was the focus of the second case study.  QPass’  
troubles stemmed from maintaining too broad a product scope, and were exacerbated by 
the collapse of the Internet bubble.  Despite reaching rock bottom, however, QPass was 
able to narrow its scope, undergo additional reforms, and as a result gain new investors.  
Eventually Amdocs acquired the company for $275 million (Amdocs Inc. 2006). 
Finally, Omneon Video Networks of Sunnyvale, CA faced significant product 
development setbacks and subsequent loss of investors, initially due to poor 
communication with investors and other stakeholders.  Through strategic partnerships 
and increased efforts on communication, Omneon was able to develop a marketable 
product.  Media 100 Inc. subsequently acquired the company for $273 million (Reuters 
2002).  
Limitations and Further Research 
This investigation of restart firms is subject to several limitations.  While my 
quantitative analysis has illuminated similarities and differences between restart and 
non-restart firms, I am unable to identify causal factors that may account for these 
differences.  To do so would require the identification and testing of explanatory 
variables. 
The qualitative case studies, while informative, also require caution in arriving 
at any conclusions regarding effective actions that may “turn around” a failing restart.   
First, the studies represent a small sample of only three firms.  It is not clear how 
generalizable their experience is to the population of restarts.  Furthermore, due to the 
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difficulty of obtaining information on failing restarts, investigating only relatively 
successful restarts constitutes a “selection on the outcome,” thus introducing bias.   
Other limitations include the necessity to impose an arbitrary taxonomy of 
performance levels.  “Successful” firms were classified as those who achieved an IPO, 
while “mid-range” firms were defined as those having final exit values above zero, but 
without reaching an IPO.  Many mid-range firms were acquired for “pennies on the 
dollar,” while some were purchased for substantial premiums (including both QPass and 
Omneon Video Networks).  This category therefore, includes some firms that are 
similar to “failed” firms while others that could arguably be considered a “success.”  
Future research could look more closely at these mid-range firms and improve the 
classification used in this analysis.  
Other promising avenues of future study include investigating whether a startup 
backed by a VC in one area is more likely to fail, or lose their investors, than a firm in 
another state.  Such a study could provide insight into the psychological environment 
that these ‘restart firms’ face, and how this affects their development.  
Conclusion 
Once again, according to entrepreneurship scholar Scott Shane, entrepreneurs 
“introduce new goods and serves, ways of organizing markets, processes, and raw 
materials through organizing efforts that previously had not existed,” they also face risk 
at each stage of the process (Shane 2002).  These risks often result in entrepreneurial 
failure, as has been well documented.  Some seemingly failed entrepreneurs get a 
“second chance” through a restart.  Despite this important mechanism within the 
entrepreneurial process, little is known about restarts.  In order to better understand this 
 
 
27  
phenomenon, this thesis investigates the incidence of restarts, their geographic 
concentration, and how they perform relative to non-restart firms.  I also explore the 
restart process through a detailed investigation of three restart firms. 
I find similarities among their potential relationship to economic events, such as 
the Internet Bubble, and their geographic proximity to areas of venture capital financing.  
I also observe that restart firms tend to perform less well than non-restart firms.  Finally, 
I identify actions undertaken by entrepreneurs who “turned things around” and survived 
the restart process.  The two-part analysis contained in this thesis helps to shed light on 
the restart phenomenon as well as providing a basis for further research. 
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VIII.  Tables and Figures 
Tables 
Table 1. Distribution of Overall Sample 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Restart and Non-Restart Initial Comparison 
 
 
Table 3. Non-Restart Firms: Initial Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Table 4. Restart Firms: Initial Descriptive Statistics 
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Table 5. Non-Restart Firms: Geographic Statistics 
Table 6. Restart Firms: Geographic Statistics 
Table 7. Geographic Distribution Concentrating in California 
 
 
Table 8.  Non-Restart: Founding Year Statistics 
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Table 9. Restart Firms: Founding Year Statistics 
Table 10. Restart Firms: Restart Year Statistics 
Table 11. Non-Restart Firms: Exit Type Statistics 
 
Table 12. Restart Firms: Exit Type Statistics 
Table 13. Case Study Overview 
Firm Name Constant Contact QPass Omneon Video 
Networks 
Location Waltham, MA Seattle, WA Sunnyvale, CA 
Founding 
Year 
1998 1997 1998 
Restart Year 2002 2002 2002 
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Industry 
Sector 
Business Applications 
Software 
Vertical Market 
Applications 
Software 
Multimedia 
Networking 
Software 
Core 
Weaknesses 
-  Founders’ 
leadership weaknesses 
- Flawed Business 
Model and Financial 
Plan 
- Lack of ability to 
exploit competitive 
advantages 
- Susceptible to major 
economic changes: the 
Internet bubble 
- Susceptible to 
major economic 
changes: the Internet 
bubble 
- Too broad of a 
scope for their 
capabilities through 
a flawed business 
model 
- Significant 
product 
development delays 
- Inability to 
initially overcome 
industry barriers as 
well as their 
expertise barriers 
Solutions - Instituting a 
unfiltered feedback 
system to point out 
informational gaps and 
improve leadership 
styles 
- Redirecting their 
scope on a narrower 
sector of the market 
- Maintaining a 
constant flow of 
information among 
stakeholders to 
successfully 
recapitalize and 
redirect their 
business 
- Actively utilized 
and created 
strategic alliances 
in order to produce 
superior product 
and value 
- Assuring and 
remaining in 
constant contact 
with stakeholders 
remain funded 
throughout the 
development 
process 
Exit Type Initial Public Offering Acquisition Acquisition  
Final 
Valuation 
$340 million $275 million $273 million 
Figures 
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Figure 1. The “Internet Bubble” as Evidenced by the Nasdaq Index 
 
Figure 2. US Venture Capital Investments in Software Startups, 1995-2012 
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Figure 3. Annual Percentage Change in VC Investments in Software Startups, 1995-
2011 
 
Figure 4. VC-backed Software Startups by Year Established, 1991-1999 
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Figure 5. Software “Restarts” in the Sample, 1991-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Silicon Valley vs. All California Venture Capital Investments 
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Figure 7. Histogram of Final Exit Value for Overall Sample 
 
Figure 8. Histogram of Final Exit Value for Restart Sample 
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Figure 9. Histogram of Final Exit Value for Non-Restart Sample 
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